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________________________________
Kathryn J. Madden, MCP, SMArchS
Abstract: This paper analyzes home lending trends measured in dollars lent per census 
tract per capita in Worcester, MA, in order to determine whether anti-discrimination 
measures have been successful, and to suggest this framework for analysis and policy 
remedies for cities with similar challenges. When analyzed alone with Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) and conventional lending by tract, proportional rates of African-
American residency were found to be negatively correlated with conventional lending, and 
Hispanic residency was found to be negatively correlated with both conventional and FHA 
lending, rejecting the null hypothesis that race/ethnicity and home lending would have no 
observable relationship. When compared in multi-variate analysis alongside other 
neighborhood characteristics that could influence mortgage lending, however, rates of 
owner-occupancy, foreclosures, and median income were discovered to be strongly 
correlated with home lending trends, while race/ethnicity was not. Given these findings, 
there is insufficient evidence to conclude the active presence of discriminatory lending, but
the sum of these analyses demonstrates a statistically significant link between low to 
median income, low homeownership, and Hispanic and African-American population in 
the city of Worcester.
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Introduction
Since its signature into law in 1977, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) has 
represented a vital cornerstone of financial regulation in service of community 
redevelopment. Intended to curb the discriminatory lending practices (“red-lining”) of 
banks and other brick-and-mortar financial institutions, the CRA and the related program 
of home loans under the Federal Housing Administration aims to offer the keystone of 
American equity growth – homeownership – to families and communities otherwise 
subject to systemic disinvestment. After nearly forty years of regulatory practice amidst a 
changing financial and political landscape, it is the goal of this paper to assess the impact 
of the CRA and the FHA in ending geographic patterns of discrimination in home lending, 
and by doing such erode or efface the geographic link between racial and ethnic minority 
populations and poverty embodied in American cities' slums, tenements, and “ghettos” 
throughout the nation's history. This evaluation, it is hoped, will help to inform anti-
discrimination policy implementation and evaluation at the municipal level in the subject 
city and other municipalities working to increase homeownership and undo the geographic 
impacts of systemic discrimination. 
The methodology of this paper is to evaluate the success of anti-discrimination 
lending laws in Worcester, Massachusetts by comparing rates of mortgage lending in 2015 
with rates of minority population by census tract and analyzing this observed relationship 
in comparison with neighborhood characteristics that might indicate barriers to mortgage 
investment (such as low median income and low rates of owner-occupancy). 
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Worcester, Massachusetts, was chosen as the geographic subject of the project for 
several reasons. First, Worcester is presently described amongst other New England 
industrial metropolises as  a weak market city, with limited housing demand and no market
for middle-to-high end housing development as compared to the large and aging quantity 
of housing stock, both of which depress market prices.1 It also is a city of demographic 
diversity, including older white and African American populations as well as new 
immigrants from Latin America, Asia, Europe and Africa. These characteristics make 
pressing the issues of housing investment distribution and discrimination. Although 
Worcester's rate of homeownership stands under national averages at 46.6%, the city has 
far higher rates of owner-occupancy than neighboring metropolises such as Springfield, 
Hartford, or Providence.2 The framework of federal housing legislation studied in this 
paper exists to support the growth of homeownership in cities such as Worcester, where the
free market has struggled to sustain housing prices at a level that incentivizes new 
construction, and the  population contains significant numbers of minority residents who 
could be disserved by discriminatory red-lining. In addition to the factors above, the data 
collection undertaken for the set of regression analyses was complemented by windshield 
surveys of Worcester's neighborhoods.
This multi-variate regression analysis is undertaken with the null hypothesis that 
there is no relationship between a neighborhood's racial composition and its respective rate
1 Peter Cohen,“Why are Worcester's Housing Prices Stuck?” Worcester Telegram and Gazette, June 11, 
2014, http://www.telegram.com/article/20140611/COLUMN70/306119997.
2 -, “Worcester by the Numbers: Housing and Land Use.” Worcester Regional Research Bureau, Inc, 13:7 
(Aug. 2013), http://www.wrrb.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/worcester-by-the-numbers-housing-and-land-
report-2013.pdf.
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of mortgage lending. In order to correct against rates of minority population masking other 
salient variables that bear upon mortgage lending rates, the minority populations of each 
census tract will be compared against median incomes, rates of foreclosures, and rates of 
owner-occupancy by census tract.
It is the hypothesis of this paper that Hispanic and African-American populations in
the city of Worcester have a measurable relationship when analyzed alone with rates of 
mortgage lending in 2015, and that this relationship will be negative. First, it is expected 
that mortgage lending trends will reflect bias against African-American or Hispanic 
borrowers in the form of lower rates of mortgage origination. Many of the precedents for 
this paper's analysis (outlined in the Literature Review chapter) lend credence to the 
continued existence and monetary influence of racial discrimination in mortgage lending. 
In Boston and New York, as well as other examples across the United States, comparable 
regression analyses have uncovered evidence of a statistically-significant negative 
relationship between minority populations and mortgage lending trends. 
In addition to outright discrimination, it is the contention of this paper that the 
negative relationship between mortgage lending and minority populations in Worcester is 
complicated by the phenomenon of segregation and the resultant concentration of minority 
populations in neighborhoods deemed high-risk by mortgage lenders. This particular 
manifestation of segregation is fundamental to the practice of red-lining, combining simple
bias against African-American or Hispanic borrowers with geographic indicators of risk. A 
very oversimplified history of race in the modern United States depicts a chain of cause 
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and effect from bias to segregation upheld by economic sanction, whereby African-
American workers move to urban centers for employment, were shut out from 
opportunities for economic success (job promotion, job access, or home lending, as 
examples), settled in urban neighborhoods within their economic ability, and saw 
increasing disinvestment in these neighborhoods under programs like urban renewal in the 
1960's or formal boundaries against departure erected in the metrics of the historic Home 
Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC). Although the programmatic approach of urban 
renewal has been improved by public process and the HOLC has been dissolved, their 
impacts remain a crucial force behind the ongoing existence of segregation in American 
society. This paper identified that census tracts with low median incomes and low rates of 
homeowner occupancy also have disproportionately high rates of minority populations in 
the city of Worcester, and that these non-racial characteristics are relevant as negative 
incentives for mortgage lending even in the absence of explicit racial bias on the part of 
home mortgage lenders. 
Census data suggests that unlike many larger cities with enclaves of immigrant or 
minority populations, Worcester's African-American and Hispanic population is dispersed 
across all 44 census tracts, making housing bias harder to perpetrate and evaluate on a 
geographic level. Further, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data suggests that 
there are relatively low numbers of mortgages initiated citywide. Despite characteristics of 
high homeownership discussed in the Methodology section below, most housing turnover 
in the city of Worcester at present appears to be rental units rather than mortgaged homes. 
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These characteristics of low home purchase rates and dispersed minority population pose 
potential challenges to a robust model of housing discrimination.
The findings of this paper demonstrate a correlation between rates of minority 
populations and mortgage lending in the city of Worcester, but that this correlation is less 
significant as a predictor of mortgage lending trends by census tract than foreclosure rates, 
median income, and rates of owner-occupancy. This mixed result suggests that current 
anti-discrimination measures have been effective in curbing explicit racial bias against 
borrowers and neighborhoods, but that race and geographic poverty continue to share a 
statistically significant relationship that leads in effect to lower home lending to 
predominantly minority neighborhoods. The policy implications of this paper would 
include the maintenance of current anti-discrimination measures including the CRA and 
FHA lending, but also suggest the need for buttressing these programs with municipal 
policy aimed at helping minority borrowers and neighborhoods to achieve higher incomes 
and avenues for homeownership. Worcester's community development corporations 
(CDCs) and community development financial institutions (CDFIs) already play a 
significant role in developing low income housing and accepting risk in developing in 
underserved neighborhoods. The limited correlation between race and lending trends as 
compared to the strength of median income, foreclosure rates, and owner-occupancy as 
relevant variables for mortgage lending can help to model further avenues of community 
development in Worcester aimed at these neighborhood characteristics to allow for growth 
in homeownership without lending discrimination. 
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Review of Literature
This study relies on a number of secondary sources and case studies as the basis for
its theoretical direction and methodology. Several authors in Massachusetts and beyond 
have relied upon similar statistical analysis to determine the impacts of anti-discrimination 
legislation. The approach and choice of variables, however, have differed dramatically, 
influenced by the varying agendas and disciplines of analysis. Despite the similar 
methodological approaches and data sources shared by many of these studies, the above-
mentioned reports and countless others reflect a lack of consensus upon the mechanisms, 
impact, or even existence of discriminatory red-lining. In the body of literature regarding 
evaluation of the CRA and anti-discrimination impacts, there is a marked contrast between 
regulators and academics on the one hand and economists in the banking sector on the 
other. Academics and regulators focus upon observable impacts in community 
demographics, and frequently argue for a stronger mandate for the CRA and other anti-
discrimination programs given the ongoing geographic concentration of minority 
populations in poverty. Bank officials and economists focus upon the effect of regulation 
on the lending market and conclude frequently that no further oversight is needed and that 
existing geospatial variance in lending trends conform to rational market forces rather than 
discrimination. The sources outlined below include both perspectives and several analyses 
that use a similar regression analysis approach to study the subject of discrimination in 
home lending.
Neil Bhutta's “The Community Reinvestment Act and Mortgage Lending to Lower 
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Income Borrowers and Neighborhoods,” closely mirrors the intended goals of this paper, 
providing a larger national analysis of CRA efficacy using many of the same data sources 
upon which this project will rely.3 Bhutta argues that CRA lending overall had little impact 
on low-income lending, but had positive effects in reducing externalities rooted in racial 
bias and lack of information in large metropolitan areas in the late 1990's and early 2000's, 
where regulation was enforced more strictly. In these cases, the CRA was successful in 
driving bank lending to low-income tracts, thus generating information regarding risk 
derived from foreclosure rates and a growing body of bank loans. This, in turn, eliminated 
a market externality rooted in a lack of information and served to increase loans from both 
CRA-compliant institutions as well as non-CRA lenders who became involved following 
their example. Overall, the market moved towards greater lending for low-income 
homebuyers, but the CRA was found to have muted effect outside of the virtuous cycle 
described above.
“The Community Reinvestment Act and Targeted Mortgage Lending,” by Drew 
Dahl, Doughlass Evanoff, and Michael Spivey. looks at the overall impacts and goals of 
the CRA's mortgage lending oversight, complementing the Bhutta article above in terms of
looking at the larger impact illustrated by the data gathered from lending trends.4 These 
authors specifically look at banking activity in periods of rating change (an immediate 
period in which CRA-compliant banks were subject to re-valuation by auditors and 
3 Neil Bhutta, “The Community Reinvestment Act and Mortgage Lending to Lower Income Borrowers and 
Neighborhoods.” The Journal of Law and Economics, 54:4. (Nov., 2011). pp. 953-983. 
4 Drew Dahl, Douglass Evanoff, and Michael Spivey, “The Community Reinvestment Act and Targeted 
Mortgage Lending.” Journey of Money, Credit, and Banking, 42: 7 (Oct. 2010), pp. 1351-1372.
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therefore were under great pressure to maintain compliance) and determined that past 
reforms were effective in increasing lending to low-to-moderate income borrowers, while 
downgrades in bank's ratings had less impact. The reforms found to have the greatest 
positive impact linked bank rating to community outcomes, including a broad range of 
activities undertaken by lending institutions beyond  consciously adapted lending to appeal
to regulatory oversight when such oversight was an immediate keystone of an impending 
merger. Punishing banks by downgrading their rating without an impending merger was 
shown to have limited effect on compliant lending, by contrast. 
In addition to economic analysis, the perspective of legislative regulators provides 
formal analysis and success measures for the CRA in achieving its ultimate goal of 
combating discrimination and systemic oppression.  “The Performance and Profitability of 
CRA-Related Lending,” a Federal Bank report issued to Congress, underlines the issues 
and challenges faced by the CRA on its 25th anniversary in the year 2000.5 Amongst their 
concerns, regulators noted the expanding scope and shape of the financial lending market, 
which threatened to make obsolete the lending requirements of the CRA. Worryingly, the 
study reveals that only 30% of home loans were subject to CRA oversight as of the year of 
publication. These limitations may hinder CRA efficacy and suggest policy course for the 
future. Sandra Braunstein's “The Community Reinvestment Act,” an address before the 
Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, provides a less 
detailed but more contemporary summary of CRA challenges, eight years after the above 
5 -, “The Performance and Profitability of CRA-Related Lending.” Federal Reserve System  (July 2000), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/communitydev/files/cra_cratext.pdf.
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report.6 She provides helpful context and history for the CRA, but also highlights the same 
issues of breadth and obsolescence that threatened the act on its 25th anniversary and 
hinder its efforts today. In addition, she offers potential directions for the CRA's 
improvement to better serve low-income communities, including potential expansion to 
non-depository financial institutions or to cover digital lending from institutions with no 
physical presence in or near the neighborhoods in which they invest. Both of these, she 
cautions, have extensive risks associated with effective compliance, given the wide range 
of institutions from international banks to pawn shops and check cashing companies that 
could be affected by new legislation.
There exist ample precedents for this study that inform this project's approach to 
studying mortgage discrimination and the methodology of a regression analysis. The 
Boston Federal Reserve Bank (Boston FED) and Redevelopment Authority (BRA, now 
known as the Boston Planning and Development Agency) have been at the forefront of 
redlining studies ever since the housing crisis in the city from 1988-1991. Explored in 
Dreir's “Redlining Cities,” in 1988 Boston faced a financial scandal in the early months of 
the Flynn administration, as the populist mayor tasked the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
and BRA to investigate claims of lending discrimination in the wake of the nationwide 
Community Reinvestment Act overhaul following the 1988 S&L bailout.7 Initial reports 
obtained by the press suggested that white applicants were up to 40% more likely to see 
6 Sandra Braunstein, “The Community Reinvestment Act.” Address before the Committee on Financial 
Services, U.S. House of Representatives, February 13, 2008.
7 Peter Dreir, “Redlining Cities: How Banks Color Community Development.” Challenge, 34:6 (Nov., 1991),
pp. 15-23.
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their applications approved as compared to their minority counterparts in the city. The 
public furor that followed convinced city officials of their need to investigate lending 
activities with an eye towards racial and geographic equity.
One influential 1992 study, undertaken by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 
expanded upon traditional analysis of red-lining by identifying and testing variables 
underrepresented in previous analyses of mortgage discrimination. Munnell et. al., 
“Mortgage Lending In Boston,” utilizes mortgage data made available under the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act to undertake regression analysis aimed at uncovering whether the
racial characteristics of census tracts influenced rates of mortgage origination.8 The authors
set out to complete a regression analysis similar to reports by the Boston Fed, but attempt 
to account for risk factors which could influence geographic lending patterns irrespective 
of minority populations, including unemployment rates and rates of poverty by 
neighborhood. The authors contend that non-biased lenders could withhold loans to 
individuals with bad credit, or in neighborhoods with historically high rates of foreclosure, 
and these rational market-driven decisions could disproportionately affect people of color 
without proving any formal practice of red-lining or mortgage discrimination, but 
demonstrating instead that poverty and race were intertwined prior to mortgage investment.
Further, Munnell et al point out that previous studies neglect other conditional factors, such
as default costs associated with past foreclosures, variable loan characteristics, and some 
relevant credit-impacting personal information. With a host of methodological flaws 
8 Alicia Munnell, Geoffrey Tootell, Lynn E Browne, and James McEneaney. “Mortgage Lending in Boston: 
Interpreting HMDA Data.” The American Economic Review, 86:1 (Mar., 1996), pp.25-53.
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identified, the authors rely on additional surveying and rates of annual foreclosure by tract 
as data to help assess the explanatory value of risk versus racial composition in 
determining rates of mortgage origination, ultimately utilizing the same tools of regression 
analysis selected for the present study. In a landmark discovery, the authors concluded that 
African-American and Hispanic applicants in Boston census tracts with similar 
characteristics, credit risks, and geographic risk factors to white counterparts were 
significantly less likely to have their loan applications approved. This study shaped 
discussion of mortgage lending and red-lining in the Commonwealth and broader United 
States, provoking critical rebuttals and methodological refinements for other settings such 
as those below. 
Following directly in the example of Munnell et al., Tootell's “Redlining in 
Boston,” published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics in late 1996, sought to refine 
studies of home lending discrimination in Boston by analyzing its correlation with race and
with perceptions of race concentration.9 Given this history and the litany of contrasting 
studies that followed in the wake of the 1988 CRA revisions and Boston's housing crisis of 
the same year, Tootell's study aims to measure geographic lending rates versus individual 
applicant successes, in both accounting for the race of applicants or the geographic 
concentration of minority populations. Ultimately, the article concludes that there is 
insufficient statistical evidence to conclude that geographically-determined red-lining is 
taking place in Boston, but that bias remains against minority applicants in the city 
9 Tootell, Geoffrey M. B. “Redlining in Boston: Do Mortgage Lenders Discriminate Against 
Neighborhoods?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111:4 (Nov., 1996). pp. 1049-1079.
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individually as measured in individual application success rates. Unlike traditional red-
lining, where whole neighborhoods suffered discrimination for the presence or perception 
of minority residency, Tootell's article suggests that individual minority applicants 
struggled to see mortgage origination as compared to white clients with similar 
qualifications, but that neighborhoods with minority populations did not suffer statistically-
significant discrimination beyond that suffered by their minority residents.
A counterexample of limited correlation between mortgage lending rates and 
neighborhoods' racial composition can be seen in Holmes and Horvitz, “Race, Risk, and 
Demand,” published in the Journal of Finance in 1994.10 Relying on the same HMDA and 
US Census datasets, the authors attempt to further refine the regression analysis carried out
by Munnell et al, arguing again that risk was insufficiently assessed in previous studies to 
their own, but also that assessments of differing levels of credit demand were absent from 
previous reports. Corrected for these variables, Holmes and Horvitz determined that for 
census tracts in Houston, Texas, there was no statistically significant correlation between 
geographic distribution of minority populations and rates of conventional mortgage 
origination. With only moderate confidence in a negative relationship between growing 
minority populations and falling mortgage origination, the authors conclude that the 1994 
levels of bank regulation embodied in the 1968 Fair Housing Act and 1977 Community 
Reinvestment Act were either sufficient to curtail discriminatory lending or even too harsh 
to allow for the operation of an efficient market, seeing as lenders were demonstrated to be
10 Andrew Holmes and Paul Horvitz, “Mortgage Redlining: Race, Risk, and Demand,” The Journal of 
Finance, 49:1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 81-99. 
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allocationally rational in their study. These objections, echoed in the wake of the 1988 
reforms to the CRA and repeated again throughout its ongoing history, are characteristic of 
economic rebuttals of government regulation of the mortgage lending market, including 
Macey and Miller's “The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis,” which 
claim that CRA restrictions disincentivize mortgage investment in poor neighborhoods. 
This theory, however, is at odds with the Federal Reserve documents and Neil Bhutta's 
above-mentioned article on the CRA, which chart a profitable and growing market in 
mortgage lending to low-income borrowers. 
Nesiba in his 1996 article “Racial Discrimination in Housing Lending Markets,” 
asks not why or if lending institutions or officers discriminate, but why empirical 
researchers and economists lack consensus upon the simple existence of systemic racial 
bias in lending patterns.11 Where activists and regulators perceive tangible differences 
between geographic concentrations of white versus minority mortgage origination, 
economic analysts are satisfied to classify these trends as results of other market forces or 
an aberration of individual lenders' “taste for discrimination,” soon to be corrected by the 
activity of rational market actors. The article categorizes studies of discrimination through 
HMDA data by four types: analysis of rejection rates, “fair share” analysis (per household 
loans), branch openings/closures, and regression analysis. Each of these approaches yields 
strong results that point to racial discrimination, but economists reject case study evidence 
as essentially irrelevant to the economic model of free market activity. 
11 Reynold Nesiba, “Racial Discrimination in Housing Lending Markets: Why Empirical Researchers Always
See it and Economic Theorists Never Do,” Journal of Economic Issues, 30:1 (Mar., 1996), pp. 51-77.
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Methodology
This paper analyzes the success of the Community Reinvestment Act using a 
univariate and multi-variate regression model to determine correlation between mortgage 
lending rates and concentrations of minority populations in Worcester, Massachusetts in 
order to evaluate whether the CRA has been successful in eliminating geographic racial 
discrimination and to suggest potential policy changes. The methodology chosen for this 
project is an ordinary least squares linear regression analysis of mortgage lending rates in 
Worcester, Massachusetts. Although the regression model chosen does not include a spatial
dimension like a geographically-weighted regression analysis, the demographic data is still
mapped by census tract to allow for analysis and to offer some context for the results 
reached by regression. 
Several demographic data sources are used in conjunction with the illustrative 
academic secondary sources listed above to design the study's regression analysis. To 
analyze impacts on an individual and systemic level in Worcester, Massachusetts, this 
paper focuses on three major data sources. The first data point is mortgage lending 
information made available under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), focusing 
upon loans made in Worcester and specifically lending trends geographically mapped 
within historically red-lined census tracts in the city. Given the need for spatial data 
analysis listed above, this project relies upon demographic information made available 
through the US Census, including median income levels, poverty rates, and racial and 
ethnic composition of Worcester's census tracts. If the CRA is effective in disincentivizing 
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home lending discrimination, then the regression analysis would show a lack of correlation
between minority populations in Worcester census tracts and their respective rates of 
mortgage origination. Finally, to assess mortgage lending risk and account for this variable 
in the regression model, this study uses foreclosure rates per household in Worcester's 
census tracts, available through the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
Regression analysis was chosen for its promise to determine the existence and 
strength of statistical relationships between independent variables. If the Community 
Reinvestment Act was completely successful in curbing discriminatory lending practices, 
then a univariate regression model analyzing mortgage lending rates as a dependent 
variable would observe no correlation with the population of African-American or 
Hispanic residents as independent variables in a given neighborhood. The first step 
therefore is to run a univariate regression model assessing the covariance of mortgage 
lending and racial distribution by census tract. 
After this initial univariate regression analysis, it is appropriate to analyze race 
amongst other variables which indicate geographic distribution of lending risk, assuming 
that race is found to have a statistically significant relationship with lending trends. A 
precedent for this study (Chan et al) determined that default rates by tracts increased with 
the rate of foreclosure notices and the number of lender-owned properties, and these 
default rates in turn influenced lending rates as they indicated geographic risk to 
prospective lenders.12 In order to compare the relative importance of these risk indicators 
12 Chan, Sewin, Michael Gedal, Vicki Been, and Andrew Haughwout. “The Role of Neighborhood 
Characteristics in Mortgage Lending Risk: Evidence from New York City,” Journal of Housing 
Economics, 22:2 (June 2013), pp. 100-118. 
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against the impact of racial bias, this paper uses a multi-variate ordinary least squares 
regression analysis to examine these variables alongside race and neighborhood poverty 
rates and median income in bearing upon mortgage lending rates by census tract.
Each of the proposed regression analyses analyzes mortgage lending measured in 
dollars per capita in each census tract in the target area. This dependent variable includes 
two categories of mortgage lending available for public access under the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act: FHA and VA mortgages and conventional mortgages. These two categories
comprise the majority of home lending investment in the study area, and further represent 
the vehicle of housing access and equity growth intended to be made available to minority 
homebuyers under the CRA.
In order to carry out a comprehensive regression analysis and construct a robust 
statistical model, a number of data sources were required to describe demographic and 
mortgage lending conditions in Worcester. Made available under the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act and published online by the Federal Financial Investigations Examination 
Council (FFIEC), mortgage lending data is downloadable by geography at the census tract 
level as opposed to the census block or block group level (where it could violate borrowers'
right to privacy). With this geographic limitation, all other data chosen for this project was 
tailored to the census tract level where available. The HMDA lending data available 
organizes home lending by five categories: FHA and other government-backed loans, 
conventional mortgages, refinances, loans on manufactured homes, and loans on property 
for five or more families. While all of this data was formatted for use in the final map, this 
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report chose to focus on conventional mortgage lending and FHA mortgage lending as the 
dependent variable for analysis, as discussed above. Each category of the annually-released
HMDA data includes subcategories for the number of loans of each type originated and the
dollar sum of these loans by tract. After consideration the FHA and conventional mortgage 
value sum was used, as it encompassed mortgages of varying dollar values in Worcester's 
neighborhoods and thereby provided a more accurate picture of investment than raw 
numbers of mortgage originations. The HMDA dataset downloaded and utilized for this 
report was “Loans Sold, by Characteristics of Borrower and Of Census Tract in which 
Property Is Located And By Type of Purchaser, 2015.”
Given the geographic constraints imposed by the HMDA data, census data was 
downloaded to the census tract to match with mortgage lending information. This data 
constituted both the raw demographic data needed to determine minority populations and 
rates of poverty by neighborhood, but also the shapefiles needed to create the illustrative 
maps. The shapefiles used by the 2010 Census to determine tract boundaries are available 
through the Massachusetts Office of Geographic Information, and were downloaded and 
then cropped to the constituent tracts of the city of Worcester (7301.00 to 7331.02). In 
order to construct a full picture of neighborhood demographics and homeownership, three 
datasets were sought from the U.S. Census Bureau's online American Community Survey 
FactFinder for the most recent years for which estimates are available, 2014. These are the 
2014 5-year estimates of Selected Economic Characteristics, Selected Housing 
Characteristics, and Race and Ethnicity. Downloaded for the above-mentioned census 
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tracts in Worcester's city limits and immediate environs, this census data describes the 
demographics, employment, housing, and economic conditions of the city and its 
surroundings. Although a total of 44 census tracts were included in the census shapefiles, 
two (7312.01 and 7329.02) were omitted. These two constitute the exact boundaries of 
Clark University and the College of the Holy Cross, both of which skew mortgage lending,
demographic, and economic statistics towards their college-age populations, and were left 
out of calculations in the final model to account for their outlying profiles.  As census 
estimate data, these demographic statistics have a small margin of error and can be subject 
to sampling errors. The office of Housing and Urban Development makes public an annual 
summary of foreclosures by census tract (and larger geographies), including several key 
indicators of risk. For the purposes of this study, HUD's estimated rate of foreclosures per 
conventional mortgage origination in 2015, the census' 2014 estimates of housing tenure, 
and the census' estimation of household median income by census tract serve together as 
an indicator of neighborhood risk and housing capacity to be measured against the racial 
characteristics of each census tract as a predictor of mortgage lending. 
Although current, the HUD data on foreclosures is mapped to pre-2010 census 
boundaries, meaning that certain tracts in Worcester which were later split into seperate 
tracts due to population growth are presented as a single whole in HUD's data on housing. 
As a result, the regression analyses and resulting maps which utilize HUD data as the 
above-mentioned risk assessment merged these tracts' demographic and HMDA data. For a
few demographics, this was a case of simple addition; for median values (such as the 
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median family income, used in regression analysis), an average of the two values was 
taken. Although this allows for less precision in these tracts of Worcester city, it remains 
statistically accurate and allows for a comparison of geographic factors of risk and race as 
independent variables weighing upon mortgage lending trends.
Given these datasets, a few ratios needed to be created to correct for the varying 
sizes and populations of census tracts in Worcester and avoid an inaccurate final model. 
Mortgage lending measured in dollars or origination, regardless of risk or prejudice, is 
naturally lower where neighborhoods have fewer households or occupants. For this reason,
a ratio of conventional mortgage origination dollars per capita in each neighborhood was 
constructed. In addition, the final datasets were used to calculate the percentage of African-
American residents and Hispanic residents per census tract rather than rely on raw 
numbers. With the data formatted for use and mapped to 2010 and 2000 Census boundaries
in Worcester, Massachusetts, the set of univariate and multi-variate regression analyses can
be run in GeoDa. The resultant outliers can be mapped in Worcester's census tracts, 
allowing for analysis of neighborhoods in the city where lending trends have outliers above
and below the best-fit regression line. The end results of this project are a set of univariate 
regression analyses that model FHA and conventional mortgage lending trends in 
relationship to race and ethnicity by census tract in Worcester, a further set of multi-variate 
regression analyses that model these relationships in comparison to median income, 
housing tenure, and foreclosure rates, and finally a set of reference maps that depict race 
and mortgage trends by tract and outliers from the original univariate regression models 
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which depict a significant relationship between the chosen variables.
There exist some limitations to the methodology chosen for this report. First, the 
relatively small number of observations of the independent and dependent variables (one 
observation each per census tract, for a total of 38 each) makes it possible that the 
pg. 24
Illustration 1: Regression Analysis Variables for Worcester, MA, 2015 (Sources: U.S. 
Census and HUD)
Tract # Med Fam. Inc. FHA per capita Conv per capita  Foreclosures % Black % Hisp. % Owner-Occ
730100 $80,054.00 $520 $260 6% 22% 6% 83%
730200 $97,908.00 $440 $360 6% 9% 9% 74%
730300 $86,682.00 $460 $80 7% 4% 6% 62%
730401 $39,375.00 $230 $60 6% 10% 32% 30%
730402 $54,602.00 $60 $190 9% 15% 23% 60%
730500 $47,318.00 $160 $40 10% 20% 12% 37%
730600 $102,649.00 $170 $380 5% 6% 6% 80%
730700 $83,362.00 $650 $440 6% 10% 11% 73%
730801 $138,125.00 $170 $670 5% 3% 3% 80%
730802 $101,750.00 $130 $240 7% 3% 1% 67%
730901 $93,370.00 $180 $270 6% 4% 8% 60%
730902 $76,622.00 $310 $130 6% 10% 7% 65%
731000 $63,131.00 $260 $170 8% 16% 12% 52%
731101 $51,875.00 $310 $150 8% 12% 24% 47%
731102 $59,417.00 $200 $180 7% 15% 9% 52%
731200 $29,228.00 $60 $60 11% 8% 42% 13%
731300 $32,369.00 $240 $30 11% 15% 48% 12%
731400 $25,660.00 $340 $70 12% 14% 51% 12%
731500 $24,980.00 $120 $70 11% 22% 47% 6%
731600 $35,956.00 $20 $80 7% 9% 5% 14%
731700 $17,762.00 $0 $130 7% 18% 28% 7%
731800 $34,458.00 $140 $70 10% 13% 33% 18%
731900 $38,516.00 $160 $10 13% 25% 27% 18%
732001 $15,432.00 $40 $0 13% 14% 69% 4%
732002 $70,804.00 $300 $170 8% 15% 11% 39%
732201 $70,391.00 $240 $40 7% 15% 6% 43%
732202 $43,289.00 $350 $130 7% 5% 7% 47%
732203 $39,506.00 $120 $0 8% 15% 12% 38%
732300 $64,115.00 $630 $270 7% 12% 10% 54%
732400 $24,318.00 $100 $30 11% 13% 42% 23%
732500 $40,278.00 $140 $0 13% 11% 38% 25%
732600 $35,861.00 $200 $0 11% 15% 40% 14%
732700 $30,500.00 $210 $0 10% 23% 24% 19%
732800 $63,183.50 $400 $340 7% 15% 8% 59%
732901 $70,779.00 $510 $120 8% 14% 18% 45%
733000 $41,100.00 $80 $50 10% 6% 36% 29%
733101 $59,063.00 $390 $90 8% 6% 11% 81%
733102 $72,576.00 $660 $190 8% 10% 17% 71%
MEAN $56,746.43 $255.26 $146.58 8.42% 12.42% 21.03% 42.45%
MIN $15,432.00 0 0 5% 3% 3% 4%
MAX $138,125.00 $660.00 $670 13% 25% 69% 85%
regression analysis could return unreliable results or be skewed by a small set of outliers. 
An analysis undertaken with information available at the census block or block group level
would offer a greater number of observations for analysis and thereby offer a more 
statistically robust model for the relationship between lending and race/ethnicity,. 
Expanding the number of observations would allow for analytical approaches like 
geographically-weighted regression, which could offer additional insight about the spatial 
dimensions of mortgage lending trends. 
Further, as a commentary upon red-lining, this paper suffers from the lack of HOLC
maps for the city of Worcester which would identify neighborhoods that historically 
suffered from discriminatory lending denial. These maps would strengthen the evaluation 
of CRA effectiveness by determining whether lending patterns had broken from the 
geographic boundaries of redlining that originally prompted this anti-discrimination 
legislation. 
The case studies selected in the Review of Literature demonstrate the difficulty of 
separating race from other variables in determining impacts on mortgage lending. The two 
sets of regression analysis – first analyzing race/ethnicity alone, then in the context of other
variables found relevant in the case studies – measure the relative impact of race and 
ethnicity against other demographic and market trends, but there are still other variables 
that could be collinear with race and exaggerate its impact on mortgage lending, as 
suggested by economic analysis included above. The statistical analysis undertaken in this 
paper suggests potential fruitful directions for reforming anti-discrimination programs in 
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home lending, but it is also possible that further analysis could uncover more statistically 
significant variables that bear upon home lending in Worcester.
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Illustration 2: Number and Dollar Value of FHA and Conventional 
Mortgage Lending in Worcester, MA, 2015 (source: HUD)
Tract # FHA Loans Conventional Loans FHA Lending ($) FHA Lending ($)
730100 19 9 $3,133,000 $1,527,000
730200 12 11 $2,367,000 $1,964,000
730300 12 2 $2,153,000 $353,000
730401 6 2 $1,241,000 $297,000
730402 1 2 $103,000 $316,000
730500 4 1 $585,000 $153,000
730600 8 18 $1,658,000 $3,612,000
730700 23 18 $4,528,000 $3,063,000
730801 3 11 $632,000 $2,482,000
730802 1 2 $235,000 $444,000
730901 3 5 $660,000 $993,000
730902 6 3 $1,247,000 $514,000
731000 NA NA $2,329,000 $1,539,000
731101 7 4 $1,148,000 $570,000
731102 3 3 $525,000 $480,000
731200 NA NA $557,000 $502,000
731300 6 1 $881,000 $130,000
731400 8 2 $1,561,000 $309,000
731500 4 2 $544,000 $343,000
731600 1 3 $144,000 $514,000
731700 0 1 $0 $304,000
731800 5 3 $849,000 $422,000
731900 5 1 $807,000 $55,000
732001 1 0 $152,000 $0
732002 7 5 $1,350,000 $753,000
732201 4 1 $683,000 $113,000
732202 6 3 $1,090,000 $405,000
732203 2 0 $350,000 $0
732300 NA NA $4,949,000 $2,106,000
732400 4 2 $684,000 $227,000
732500 2 0 $285,000 $0
732600 5 0 $940,000 $0
732700 5 0 $782,000 $0
732800 NA NA $3,716,000 $3,175,000
732901 19 5 $3,682,000 $894,000
733000 2 2 $324,000 $216,000
733101 5 2 $834,000 $182,000
733102 9 4 $1,427,000 $412,000
MEAN 4.7 3.76 $1,293,026 $772,868
MIN 0 0 0 0
MAX 23 18 $4,949,000 $3,612,000
Analysis
Using the variables and constraints laid out in the Methodology section of this 
report, a set of regression analyses were run to test the null hypothesis that there existed no 
statistically significant correlation between minority population and mortgage lending rates
in Worcester, Massachusetts. The first step in the regression analyses was to carry out a 
univariate ordinary least squares regression to examine the relationship between 
conventional and FHA/VA mortgage lending and rates of Hispanic and African American 
population, as well as to determine heteroskedacity, multicolinearity, and other errors in 
model strength. This initial test examined conventional mortgage lending and FHA 
mortgage lending measured in thousands of dollars per capita in each census tract as the 
dependent variables, with the percentage of African-American and Hispanic residents per 
census tract as explanatory variables. These univariate regressions and the multivariate 
regressions are reproduced in appendices  A, B, and D, and the coefficients and r-squared 
are summarized in Illustration 3.
These initial tests (see Appendix A: Regression Analysis, Figures A-1 to A-3) were  
illustrative in testing the variables chosen for regression analysis and clarifying which 
census tract characteristics showed a linear relationship with mortgage lending rates. First, 
the standard error tests which determine the probability of multicollinearity, distribution 
errors, and heteroskedasticity returned a very low probability that the dataset in question 
possessed disqualifying patterns amongst data points that would suggest non-random data 
for three of the four univariate regression analyses. Further, the three regression models 
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that passed these standard error tests reported a statistically significant correlation of 
minority population and mortgage lending rates by census tract with varying degrees of 
confidence and model fitness. 
* denotes 
P<.05
Convention
al Lending 
Per Capita
FHA 
Lending 
Per Capita
% 
African-
American
% 
Hispanic
Foreclo
sure 
Rate
Median 
Family 
Inc.
Owner-
occupanc
y
r-squared
Regression 1 0.25* - - -0.48* - - - 0.31
Regression 2 - 0.34* - -0.4* - - - 0.14
Regression 3 0.27* - -1.01* - - - - 0.16
Regression 4 - 0.29* -0.27 - - - - 0.01
Regression 5 - 0.06 - 0.11 0.99 -1.87 0.01* 0.36
Regression 6 0.57 - - 0.36* -2.74* 3.86* 0.04 0.73
Regression 7 0.05 - 0.11 - -1.4 3.7* -0.02 0.69
Regression 8 0.06 - - - -1.3 3.47* - 0.68
Regression 9 - - -0.15* -0.11* - 0.1* - 0.64
Regression 10 - - -2261 -126.8* - - 1278.8 0.32
Regression 11 - - 0.09* 0.1* ,05* - - 0.72
Illustration 3: Regression Analysis Results
The most robust results from the initial univariate regression analyses are those 
produced by the comparison of Hispanic population and conventional mortgage lending 
(see Illustration 1, Regression 1; and Appendix A, Figure A-1). The r-squared value for this
analysis, which explains the fitness of the model, showed a value of .308, suggesting that 
the explanatory variable presented explained 30.8% of observed variance in the constant. 
Although the Hispanic demographic characteristics imputed do not fully explain the 
variance of mortgage lending trends, the model suggests that they alone are responsible for
a third of the observed variation in conventional mortgage lending, suggesting their 
potential importance amongst the many factors that influence mortgage investment. 
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Figure A-1 (Appendix A) further shows the comparative P-values (labeled 
“Probability”) of the constant (conventional mortgage lending per capita) and the chosen 
variables.  The 0.00003 p-value for the independent variable – percentage of Hispanic 
residents in total tract population – also allows for the rejection of a null hypothesis of a 
coefficient equal to 0 (which would signal no observable relationship between variables). 
Finally, the regression analysis concludes that this robust model depicts a negatively linear 
relationship, with the coefficient measuring the slope of their linear relationship at -.48, 
with higher rates of Hispanic residents in Worcester census tracts strongly correlated with 
lower per capita mortgage lending.
This negative correlation is echoed with lower degrees of model fitness and 
probability in the regression analysis of FHA mortgage lending with Hispanic population 
as well as conventional mortgage lending with African-American population. The 
regression model analyzing FHA lending per capita in comparison to Hispanic population 
(Appendix A, Figure A-2) returned an r-squared of .145 and a negatively linear relationship
with a coefficient of -.4. The third model, analyzing conventional lending  per capita in 
comparison to African-American population (Appendix A, Figure A-3), shows similar 
results, with an r-squared of .155 and a negatively linear relationship with a coefficient of 
-1.01. The fourth initial univariate regression analysis, comparing FHA lending with 
African-American population (Appendix A, Figure A-4), failed to return a fit model (r-
squared <1%) and failed to reject the null hypothesis (p-value .60), and therefore saw no 
statistically significant correlation between FHA lending rates and African-American 
pg. 29
resident populations. 
These initial tests recommended that further multi-variate regression analysis be 
completed, as two of the three tests which returned significant results had relatively low 
model fitness, suggesting a dearth of other relevant factors. To this end, the three 
independent models found to show statistically significant correlation between mortgage 
lending trends and minority populations (both minority populations with conventional 
lending, and Hispanic population with FHA lending) were tested with the other 
independent variables: median income, owner-occupancy, and estimated rates of 
foreclosure by census tract. 
The regression analysis comparing FHA mortgage investment with Hispanic 
population, foreclosure rates, owner-occupancy, and median family income (Appendix B, 
Figure B-2) ultimately returned a higher r-squared (.359) than the initial univariate 
regression. It also returned no statistically significant correlation between FHA lending and
Hispanic population, median family income, or estimated rates of foreclosure. Only rates 
of owner occupancy, with a p-value of .0059, demonstrated correlation, with a positively 
linear relationship (coefficient .01). 
The same independent variables compared with conventional mortgage spending 
return further results contrasting with initial univariate findings. The complete model 
analyzing conventional lending with Hispanic population and the other above-listed 
variables (Appendix B, Figure B-2) returned a very high r-squared (.728) and found 
evidence of correlation between the dependent variable and Hispanic population (p-value .
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027), foreclosure rates (.015), and median family incomes (.001). Of these, the foreclosure 
and median family income linear relationships conform to expectations, with a negative 
linear relationship (-2.556) for foreclosures and a positive linear relationship (3.858) for 
median income. The percentage of Hispanic residents per census tract, however, was found
to have  a positive linear relationship (coefficient .36) with conventional mortgage lending,
while it was modeled as a strongly negative linear relationship (coefficient -.48) in the 
initial univariate regression. Given this variation, the multi-variate analysis (Appendix B, 
Figure B-4) was run again without tenure and Hispanic population. The resultant model 
still returned a strong linear relationship between median income and conventional lending,
with an overall r-squared value of .664 as compared to .728 in regression 6. In this case, 
the covariance between median income (which has an extremely strong relationship with 
conventional mortgage lending) and Hispanic population masked the latter variable's 
negative relationship when analyzed alone. 
Finally, the multi-variate regression for conventional lending in light of African-
American population and the other above independent variables (Appendix B, Figure B-3) 
returned similar results to the multi-variate regression analysis of conventional lending and
Hispanic population. Although the model has a high r-squared at .685, it demonstrates a 
statistically significant correlation only between conventional lending and median family 
income. This relationship is shown to be positively linear with a coefficient of 3.47.
This analysis allow for the rejection of the null hypothesis of a lack of observable 
relationship between race and mortgage lending in Worcester and point to a statistically 
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significant phenomenon of lower conventional mortgage lending investment in 
neighborhoods of proportionally greater African-American population and lower 
conventional and FHA lending in areas of proportionally greater Hispanic population. In 
each case, however, race was determined to have no observable relationship with FHA and 
conventional lending trends when analyzed alongside other demographic statistics that 
affect mortgage lending. In each case, it was rates of owner-occupancy and family median 
income respectively that demonstrated the most robust linear relationship with FHA and 
conventional mortgage lending in Worcester.
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Findings
The regression analysis performed by this study demonstrate a link between 
Hispanic and African-American populations in Worcester and the geographic distribution 
of mortgage lending in the two major categories seen in the city: FHA and VA loans, and 
conventional mortgage loans. The negative linear relationship originally returned by the 
univariate regression analyses, however, was not confirmed by comparison to other 
demographic indicators of risk that affect mortgage lending, where family median income 
and housing tenure proved to be far more effective predictors of lending trends. The lack of
evidence of race as a predictor of lending in multi-variate analysis suggests that mortgage 
lenders do not actively discriminate against neighborhoods with larger proportional 
populations of African-American or Hispanic residents, but their relationship in initial 
univariate analysis suggests that minority residents in Worcester still disproportionately 
live in neighborhoods less likely to receive home lending investment.
These results are mixed as a referendum on the CRA and government regulation in 
disincentivizing home lending discrimination and driving community investment. It would 
appear, given the multi-variate test results, that mortgage lending is not driven by the racial
characteristics of neighborhoods, therefore demonstrating that the explicit racial bias of the
HOLC and “red lining” is either not a likely component of lending criteria, or that there is 
not a consensus as to what would constitute an “undesireable” minority neighborhood in 
the city of Worcester today and therefore no active discrimination against borrowers there. 
Instead, there appears to be far more of a relationship between homeownership and income
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Illustration 4: African-American Population by Tract
Illustration 5: Hispanic Population by Tract
and respective mortgage rates than there is between race and mortgages. 
Nevertheless, the results of initial single-regression analysis suggest that 
government regulation has been insufficient in breaking the geographic link between 
communities of color and mortgage underinvestment. Within the body of literature 
reviewed for this paper, the study falls in the middle of the two camps of regulators and 
economists in analyzing  mortgages through regression analysis: it successfully rejected a 
null hypothesis in which no statistically significant relationship existed between race and 
lending, unlike Horowitz et. al. and Miller et. al., but it failed to demonstrate that race or 
ethnicity were determinants of lending to the same extent that the Boston Fed studies 
could. This paper confirms the findings of Munell et. al. in their study of Boston in 
pointing to an explanatory covariance between race and other risk factors, which in turn 
affect mortgage lending.
A few explanations for the univariate findings in contrast to the multi-variate 
regression are possible in the context of Worcester. The first potential explanation lies in 
the dataset itself. With 42 mapped census tracts, three of which were merged for the 
foreclosure rate data, and absolute numbers of conventional mortgages relatively low 
citywide, there is substantial room for potential error, which is amongst the reasons why 
the multi-variate analysis was chosen as a second step. A larger sample population or a 
study area with greater mortgage lending (or aggregating several years' mortgage lending 
trends) could serve to create a more robust statistical model. 
A second factor mentioned in the introduction of this paper is the relatively 
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integrated demographics of the city. Unlike the case studies by the Federal Reserve Bank 
in Boston and New York City, Worcester has relatively dispersed minority populations (see
Illustrations 4 and 5). The proportion of African-American population  from 3% of the total
population (in tract 7308.02) to 25% of the total population (in tract 7319), meaning that 
no census tract is majority African-American citywide (see Illustration 4).
By contrast, Hispanic population varies more widely, with a 12% minimum in two 
tracts (7305 and 7322.05) and an outlier at 69% (tract 7320.01, which is predominantly the
Greatbrook Valley public housing complex) (see Illustration 5). In addition to 7320.01, one
other tract is majority Hispanic in the city (7314), and two more have Hispanic populations
near 50% of the total population (7313 and 7315). It is possible that without clearly 
demarcated Hispanic or African-American neighborhoods, discrimination against 
geographically-concentrated minority populations as in historic red lining is impossible on 
a systemic level, and as such rates of minority populations have less observed correlation 
with mortgage lending that other demographic features. The above-mentioned majority 
Hispanic census tracts, however, constitute three of the tracts with the least conventional 
mortgage investment overall (including 7320.01, one of the five tracts with no 
conventional mortgages in 2015). 
While the multi-variate regression analysis rejects race and ethnicity as significant 
factors related to mortgage lending trends, the maps of mortgage lending demonstrate a 
visible inversion between rates of African-American and especially Hispanic residents by 
tract and those tracts' rates of conventional lending. The tracts with the greatest 
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Illustration 6: FHA Lending by Tract
Illustration 7: Conventional Lending by Tract
proportional concentration of African-American residents fall in the continuum from North
Worcester to downtown, while the majority-Hispanic tracts fall between the downtown and
Main South neighborhoods. 
Mortgage lending is relatively low in terms of numbers of mortgages originated and
the sum of their dollar values (see Illustration 2). This is both a finding of this report and a 
potential limitation of this paper's approach – greater numbers of mortgages, as seen in 
case studies in Boston and New York, would allow for greater fidelity in modeling. 
Mortgage lending is far more pronounced in the peripheral tracts of the city, overlapping 
only with African-American population to the very north in census tract 7301. 
Conventional mortgage lending has an especially notable outlier in tract 7308.01, with 
much higher lending per capita than any other census tract in the city (see Illustrations 6-
7). Finally, median family income and rates of owner-occupancy in Worcester broadly 
conform to the same peripheral trends observed with home lending, while the highest rates 
of foreclosure can be found in the central tracts of the city (Illustrations 8-10). Given this 
visual evidence, another explanation for the initial correlation of race and mortgage 
spending and its comparative weakness compared to other factors is the correlation instead 
between the significant risk factors used in the multi-variate regression and rates of 
minority population. An exploratory set of regression analyses comparing tenure and 
median family income with rates of minority population by census tract confirms 
statistically significant strongly negative linear relationships between rates of African-
American and Hispanic populations and median family income (see appendix C), and 
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between Hispanic populations and housing tenure. 
These relationships were both more strongly negative in the context of analyzing 
Hispanic populations citywide, and rates of Hispanic and African-American population 
citywide serve to explain more than 50% of observed variance in median family income 
and housing tenure (Appendix D, Figures D-1 and D-2). While the CRA may have been 
successful in curbing explicitly discriminatory lending practices in Worcester as measured 
in this aggregate analysis, this project makes clear the ongoing link between poverty, 
housing tenure, and race in the city. 
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Illustration 8: Median Family Income by Tract
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Illustration 9: Foreclosure Rates by Tract
Illustration 10: Owner-Occupancy by Tract
Conclusion
Given these findings, it is the position of this paper that government intervention in 
the housing market or in financial aid, at least in Worcester, is necessary and should be 
expanded to help minority populations in the city achieve homeownership and higher 
median income. The comparison between FHA and conventional mortgages citywide is 
illustrative towards this conclusion. Conventional mortgages saw a much stronger 
relationship (measured in r-squared values) and a much more stark negative correlation 
with rates of minority population citywide when measured in univariate analysis. FHA and 
VA lending, meanwhile, under a government mandate to serve borrowers who might be 
underserved by conventional lending, saw no negative correlation with African-American 
population and a weakly negative correlation with Hispanic population. It is the contention 
of this paper, based on the data presented, that lending programs like FHA loans 
underwritten by the federal government are an improvement over conventional mortgage 
lending for minority populations who otherwise risk low rates of mortgage origination 
based upon the correlation between race and lending risk factors observed in census tracts. 
In Worcester, policy reform suggested by the above findings could take two broad 
forms: expanding the reach or market share of existing FHA lending, or implementing a 
supplemental loan program with municipal government brokering cooperation from 
lending institutions, community development finance institutions (CDFIs), or community 
development corporations (CDCs). In Worcester, the CDCs including Main South CDC 
and Worcester Common Ground play a major role in developing affordable housing and 
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creating the opportunity for a robust housing market to develop. Given the findings 
suggested above where the main determinants of home lending appear to be income, 
foreclosure, and tenure, the role of CDCs and CDFIs can be as initial investors in a 
neighborhood where information externalities might make traditional lending sources more
reticent to offer home loans. 
The strategic goal of expanding FHA lending's market access is congruent with the 
national prerogatives of the FHA lending program, as outlined in HUD's 2014 “Blueprint 
for Access” and described in depth in the HUD 2014-2018 Strategic Plan.  These 
documents, produced in the wake of the 2007 recession triggered by unsound subprime 
lending, stress the responsibility of the Department and its partnering lending institutions 
to serve qualified borrowers despite lingering market skittishness. “FHA is committed to 
finding ways to responsibly increase access for underserved borrowers,” states the 
“Blueprint for Access.”13 The Strategic Plan confirms this commitment, and expands upon 
the findings of this paper. “While housing discrimination still takes on blatant forms in 
some instances,” the authors explain, “it has become more subtle and sophisticated through
the years, resulting in underreporting and complicating effective enforcement.”14 Given a 
regulatory environment in which outright discrimination is less common, but race and 
poverty remain closely intertwined, HUD proposes a set of strategies aimed at ensuring 
compliance with FHA lending prerogatives and increasing minority homeownership 
13 -, “Blueprint for Access.” Federal Housing Administration (May 2014), 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=BlueprintAcess5_9_2014.pdf.
14 -, “Strategic Plan 2014-2018.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (April 2014), 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=hudstrategicplan2014-2018.pdf.
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opportunities, including improved outreach initiatives and increased education for FHA 
lenders to ensure their cooperation in this effort. 
As HUD already appears broadly responsive to the general trends noted by this 
project, the policy directives for local government would involve communicating with the 
federal department in order to implement the technical assistance outlined in the first HUD 
fair housing strategy (Strategic Objective 4a). As a HUD grantee, Worcester is eligible for 
such technical assistance in support of achieving fair lending goals. Routes for 
implementation under the HUD 2014-2018 Strategic Plan include grant funding under The 
Partnership for Sustainable Communities and possibly through the Strong Cities, Strong 
Communities Initiative. These programs include funding for municipal government to 
carry out outreach in support of FHA lending. 
Communication of FHA home loan opportunities would appear vital in Worcester 
given the disproportionately low home lending observed in majority Hispanic 
communities. While the univariate analyses returned negative correlations between 
minority populations and conventional mortgage lending in the city, the single variable test
for FHA lending demonstrated no correlation between lending patterns and proportions of 
African-American residency by tract. Instead, it returned a weak negative correlation with 
the proportion of Hispanic population , demonstrating that to some degree the FHA 
program has failed to reach Hispanic residents of Worcester. It is therefore plausible that 
some reform or expansion of FHA outreach, whether in strategic approach or language 
access, could improve FHA lending trends in Hispanic communities in Worcester.
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Another policy approach at the municipal level would be to organize a consortium 
of FHA lenders to coordinate compliant mortgage lending with a measure of direction from
City government. In Worcester, there are a list of eleven total FHA licensed lenders who 
could benefit from a coordinated approach, as well as larger banks across Massachusetts 
who offer FHA loans.  While it is important that the City not hinder market 
competitiveness, it would still be possible for the city to suggest plausible strategic 
imperatives such as outreach or program reform as listed above which would improve the 
reach, effectiveness, and the ultimate return of FHA compliant lending. In Worcester, a 
similar consortium exists in the Worcester Business Development Corporation (WBDC), 
which includes board members and institutional partners from financial institutions 
citywide aimed at fostering local economic development.  It is possible – albeit a 
significant undertaking – that the strategic vision of the WBDC could be expanded to 
include fair and affordable housing amongst its goals, or a complementary consortium 
could be formed to support fair lending in the Worcester. 
The above-mentioned policy reforms build upon existing success while 
acknowledging shortcomings in the CRA and the program of FHA lending. The regression 
analysis completed by this project suggests the continued struggle of minority communities
to achieve mortgage lending and homeownership at the same rates as non-minority 
counterparts in Worcester. This, as noted by the HUD Strategic Plan, is less the result of 
blatant racial discrimination observable within the context of other lending risks as much 
as it is a result of continued failures to de-couple geographic concentration of poverty, 
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short-term housing tenure, and minority population in Worcester and many other American
urban contexts. The CRA and FHA are ultimately means to an end – shared economic 
prosperity for peoples of every race and class in the United States. Although functional in 
curbing discrimination and incentivizing opportunities for homeownership where 
otherwise unavailable, these programs have far to go in order to achieve their ultimate aim.
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Appendix A: Univariate Regression
pg. 46
Figure A-1: Single Variable Regression Analysis comparing rates of Conventional 
Mortgage Lending (measured in thousands of dollars per capita) and rates of Hispanic 
population (measured as a percentage of total population) by census tract in Worcester, 
pg. 47
Figure A-2: Single Variable Regression Analysis comparing rates of FHA Mortgage 
Lending (measured in thousands of dollars per capita) and rates of Hispanic population 
(measured as a percentage of total population) by census tract in Worcester, MA.
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Figure A-3: Single Variable Regression Analysis comparing rates of Conventional 
Mortgage Lending (measured in thousands of dollars per capita) and rates of African-
American population (measured as a percentage of total population) by census tract in 
Worcester, MA.
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Figure A-4: Single Variable Regression Analysis comparing rates of FHA Mortgage 
Lending (measured in thousands of dollars per capita) and rates of African-American 
population (measured as a percentage of total population) by census tract in Worcester, 
MA.
Appendix B: Multi-variate Regression
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Figure B-1: multi-variate Regression Analysis comparing rates of FHA Mortgage Lending 
(measured in thousands of dollars per capita) and housing tenure (measured in percent of 
owner-occupied housing units), Hispanic population (measured as a percentage of total 
population), the percentage rate of foreclosures, and median family income by census tract
in Worcester, MA.
pg. 51
Figure B-2: Multi-variate Regression Analysis comparing rates of Conventional Mortgage
Lending (measured in thousands of dollars per capita) and housing tenure (measured in 
percent of owner-occupied housing units), Hispanic population (measured as a percentage
of total population), the percentage rate of foreclosures, and median family income by 
census tract in Worcester, MA.
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Figure B-3: Multi-variate Regression Analysis comparing rates of Conventional Mortgage
Lending (measured in thousands of dollars per capita) and housing tenure (measured in 
percent of owner-occupied housing units), African-American population (measured as a 
percentage of total population), the percentage rate of foreclosures, and median family 
income by census tract in Worcester, MA.
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Figure B-4: univariate Regression Analysis comparing rates of Conventional Mortgage 
Lending (measured in thousands of dollars per capita), estimated foreclosure rate, and 
median family income by census tract in Worcester, MA.
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Figure D-1: multi-variate Regression Analysis comparing housing tenure (measured as 
percentage of owner-occupied housing units) and Hispanic and African-American 
population (measured as a percentage of total population) by census tract in Worcester, 
MA.
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Figure D-2: multi-variate Regression Analysis comparing median family income and 
Hispanic and African-American population (measured as a percentage of total population)
by census tract in Worcester, MA.
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